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Donnelly: Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement. By William Twining; Rosc

BOOK REVIEWS
KARL

LLEWELLYN AND

THE REALIST MOVEMENT.

By William

Twining.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1973. tPp. xiv, 574.
$25.00.
RoscoE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW. By David Wigdor.** Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. 1973. Pp. xi, 356. $12.95.
Reviewed by Samuel J.M. Donnelly***
Biographies of two giants have appeared. David Wigdor has
written Roscoe Pound: Philosopherof Law and William Twining
has given us Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement.
Pound and Llewellyn were leaders of movements which had
great influence on legal philosophy and legal education during the
twentieth century and which became part of the personal history
of many American lawyers. Both have contributed to important
reforms in their chosen fields of action, Pound in judicial reform,
and Llewellyn in commercial law.2 Both, in overlapping sequence,
have altered profoundly the way in which we view law and the
legal and judicial process. Each has given us a perspective, a
vision which was not ours before, and together their philosophies
have established much 3of the context for the progressive development of American law.

Both of their visions may be described as developments of
insights found in the thought of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.4 It
* The author, formerly a professor of jurisprudence at schools in Northern Ireland,
The Sudan, East Africa and the United States, is presently teaching at the University of
Warwick in England.
t Distributed in the United States by Fred B. Rothman & Co., South Hackensack,
New Jersey.
** David Wigdor has taught United States history and American Studies at Lindenwood College in St. Charles, Missouri and is presently a program officer at the National
Endowment for Humanities.
*** Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. A.B. Fordham University,
1956; J.D. Harvard University, 1960; LL.M. New York University, 1966.
1. D. WIGDOR, RosCOE POUND, PHiLosoPHER Or LAW 139-41 (1974) [hereinafter cited

as POUND].
2. W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REAIST MOVEMENT 270-302 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as LLEWELLYN].
3. Of course, this was with the cooperation of others.
4. Holmes undoubtedly provided some of the inspiration. The discussion which follows should be understood as a simplified model designed to facilitate the comparison of
Pound with the legal realists.
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has been noted 5 that there are two segments to Holmes' seminal
speech, The Path of the Law.' In the earlier part Holmes put

forward his famous dictum: "The prophecies of what the courts
will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean
by the law."' Later in his talk, Holmes undertook to advise
8
judges:
I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately
to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is
simply to leave the very ground and foundation of judgements
inarticulate, and often unconscious, as I have said. . . . I cannot but believe that if the training of lawyers led them habitually to consider more definitely and explicitly the social advantage on which the rule they lay down must be justified, they
sometimes would hesitate where now they are confident, and see
that really they were taking sides upon debatable and often
burning questions.
Pound contrasted mechanical and sociological jurisprudence
and urged lawyers and judges to weigh the social advantages of
their rules and to look upon law as social engineering.' That aspect of Pound's thought could be related to the second portion of
Holmes' speech. Legal realists such as Llewellyn were more concerned with insights found in the first portion. While doubting
the usefulness of the tools then in vogue for predicting court decisions, they sought, through studies of judicial behavior, to find
the "real rules": what the courts would in fact do.I Pound urged
5. Hart, Holmes' Positivism-An Addendum, 64 HARv. L. Rav. 929, 929-30 (1951);
see also Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARv. L. REV. 529 (1951); Howe,
Holmes' Positivism-A Brief Rejoinder, 64 HARv. L. Rav. 937 (1951).
6. 10 HARv. L. REv. 457 (1897).
7. Id. at 461.
8. Id. at 467-68.

9. POUND, p. 199; see also Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence,8 COLUm. L. Ray. 605
(1908); Pound, The Scope and Purpose of SociologicalJurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV.
591 (1911); 25 HARv. L. Ray. 140 (1912); 25 HARV. L. Rav. 489 (1912). In 25 HARV. L. REv.
489 at 516 Pound gave a summary of the goals of sociological jurisprudence. Earlier in the
same article he wrote:
The main problem to which sociological jurists are addressing themselves
today is to enable and to compel law-making, and also interpretation and application of legal rules, to take more account, and more intelligent account, of the
social facts upon which law must proceed and to which it is to be applied.
Id. at 512-13.
10. See K. LLEnuYN, JURISPRUDENCE 21 et seq. (1962); see also Llewellyn, A Realistic
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sociological studies for the purpose of finding a basis for social
policy. The legal realists employed the social sciences to study the
behavior of judges."
A further and fascinating contrast developed from these
points of departure. While Pound started with a prescription for
the decision making process of judges (be concerned with social
advantage), the direction of his scholarship would lead him to
2
studies of rules including analysis of their social advantages.'
The realists concerned with predicting judicial behavior (the real
rules) moved ultimately to studies of how judges ought to behave,
for example, to a concern for the craftsmanship of appellate
judges.' 3
The Men
Despite these contrasts Pound and Llewellyn were in many
ways similar. Both had substantial intellectual interests outside
law which influenced their legal scholarship. Pound devoted
much of his youth to the study of botany, and according to Wigdor did some excellent work in that field." Llewellyn maintained
an interest in poetry 5 and the social sciences. His poems' 6 decorate his works on jurisprudence, and The Cheyenne Way,17 a
study of Indian law written in collaboration with E. Adamson
Hoebel, an anthropologist, has changed the approach of social
scientists to the study of primitive law." Both had an interest in
comparative law. Pound's interest began in his first and only year
of law school when Professor Gray recommended Sohm's
Jurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 COLUM. L. Ra-. 431 (1930).
11. See K. LLEWELLYN JURISPRUDENCE 77, 78 et seq. (1962).
12. See, e.g., Pound's theory of interests discussed in POUND, pp. 213-14; see also
Pound, A Theory of Social Interests, 1920 PUBUCATIONS OF THE Am. SOCIOLOoICAL Soc'y 15
(1921); Pound, Interests of Personality,28 HARv. L. REv. 343 (1915). In 28 HARv. L. REv.
343 at 344 Pound states: "Strictly the concern of the law is with social interests, since it
is the social interest in securing the individual interest that must determine the law to

secure it." Compare this view with K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 14 et seq. (1962).
13. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 213 et seq.
(1960); see also the concern of Jerome Frank with craftsmanship in such passages as J.
FRANK, COURTS ON

TRIAL 247 et seq., 292 et seq., 316 et seq.

14. See generally POUND, pp. 49-67.
15. See K. LLEWELLYN, BEACH PLUMS (1931) (poems); LLEWELLYN, pp. 117-23, 555.
16. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 398 (1960);

K.

LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 214 (1962).
17. K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY

18.

(1941).

See LLEWELLYN, p. 166.
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Institutes as a basis for understanding Roman law.19 Llewellyn
wrote and lectured in German. 0 Both had a great interest in the
practice of law. Although Llewellyn spent only two years in practice before beginning his teaching career, 21 his later work with the
Uniform Commercial Code brought him into extensive contact
with the bar.22 Pound was a practicing attorney and a judge before
becoming a professor of law.2 Perhaps most significantly both
were considered radicals in their early years of fame and were
attacked in their senior years for conservatism.2 4 Pound's opposition to the New Deal is well known.2 5 The Uniform Commercial
Code has been criticized as ignoring consumer concerns 26 despite
such provisions as UCC § 2-302 which have become the basis for
many consumer oriented decisions.27 Their mature philosophical
thought, according to some, turned conservative and failed to
fulfill the promise of their youth.s Despite the enormous impact
which each had upon our current vision of law, their final large
2
and Llewworks, Pound's five volume treatise on Jurisprudence,
3 were not carefully thought
Tradition,
Law
Common
ellyn's
through, systematic presentations of lifetimes of great thought."
The Books
Pausing at this point to perform one of the functions of a
book reviewer, I can say that both books are useful. The Wigdor
biography of Pound is a pedestrian achievement by a scholar who
is not a lawyer and who, perhaps for this reason, fails to bring any
profound, insight to his study of Pound. It is nevertheless useful
to have Pound's life, professional career and writings described in
19. See POUND, pp. 39, 40.
20. LLE ELLYN, pp. 106-07. See also the fascinating episode in which Llewellyn during
World War I served as a volunteer with the 78th Prussian Infantry, was wounded and
awarded the Iron Cross. Pp. 91, 479-87 (Appendix A).
21. Id. at 101-02.
22. Id. at 270-302.
23. PouND, pp. 69-101.
24. Compare PoUND, pp. 133-59 with pp. 207-33; compare LLEWELLYN, p. 110 with p.
125.
25. PoUND, p. 267.
26. See LLEWELLYN, p. 292.
27. See, e.g., Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d. 405 (1967); Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
28. See POUND, pp. 207-32; LLEWELLYN, p. 266.
29. R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE (1959) (five volumes).
30. K. LLEWELLYN, TxE COMMON LAW TRADrTON: DECIDING APPEALS (1960).
31. See LLEWELLYN, p. 269; K. LLEwELYN, JURISPRUDENCE 495 et seq. (1962).
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an orderly way. The Twining biography of Llewellyn is a substantial scholarly achievement containing a careful and thorough
analysis of Llewellyn's work.3 2 Twining originally read law in England and then, before embarking on his biography, spent some
time studying under Llewellyn.3 3 He is also the compiler of the
Llewellyn bibliography. 4 With his English background Twining
35
is able to comment on Llewellyn from an interesting perspective,
but perhaps misses some aspects which would have been apparent to one raised in the tradition of American Legal Realism.
Some PrincipalThoughts
Having stated my recommendation in regard to the books, it
may be worth counterpointing some of the principal thoughts set
forth by the authors, particularly Wigdor's view of Pound's organicism3" and Twining's analysis of Karl Llewellyn's notion, "situation sense. '37 One can set the stage for both discussions by reviewing a controversy which took place in the early nineteen thirties.
When Llewellyn first came to prominence as a leader of the
Realist movement, the two titans clashed in a series of three
articles. In 1930, Llewellyn undertook to gather certain themes
discussed by the new thinkers in an article entitled, A Realistic
32. In addition Twining places Llewellyn in the context of legal realism and explores
legal realism through his analysis of Llewellyn's thought. See LLEWELLYN, pp. 3-83, 375-

87.
33. See LLEWELLYN, p. xi.
34. W. TWNING, THE KARL LLEWELLYN PAPaRS (1968); see also the select bibliography
in LLEWELLYN, p. 555 et seq.
35. See LLEWELLYN, p. vii where the Foreword's author, Robert Stevens, states:
But for the English trained lawyer, the Realist "Movement" has often
seemed an impenetrable barrier to comprehending the American approach to
law. Can a society which spawned such a reportedly bizarre Movement as the
Realists have any theory (or solutions) which might possibly be relevant in the
English context? This volume not only makes an answer to that question possible, it also offers the first coherent exposition both of the Movement itself, and
also of the American approach to law which underlay the rise of the Realists.
At last the mythology about the Realists-which was carried to excess in England-has been questioned, and that force which we know as the Realist Movement can be seen in perspective through the work of its leading figure-Karl
Llewellyn.
The insights of such a volume will inevitably be vital not only for the
English linguistic philosopher or legal sociologist, but for any English lawyer or
scholar concerned with the American legal scene.
But see W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1968).
36. POUND, pp. 207-32.
37. LLEWELLYN, pp. 216-27.
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Jurisprudence, The Next Step.38 In that article he criticized
Pound who replied with an article attacking the entire realist
school.39 Llewellyn and Jerome Frank collaborated in a defense
finally authored by Llewellyn."' Some points made by Llewellyn
against Pound are worth reviewing.
Llewellyn contended that Pound had a sophisticated, ruleoriented understanding of law. He explained: 4'
"Precepts" as used by Pound, for instance, I take to be
roughly synonymous with rules and principles, the principles
being wider in scope and pioportionately vaguer in connotation,
with a tendency toward idealization of some portion of the
status quo at any given time. And I think as you read Pound
that the precepts are central to his thinking about law ....
Finally, he stresses-and we meet here a very different order of
phenomena-"the traditional techniques of developing and
applying" precepts. Only a man gifted with insight would have
added to the verbal formulae and verbalized (though vague)
conceptual pictures thus far catalogued, such an element of
practices, of habits and techniques of action, of behavior. But
only a man partially caught in the traditional precept-thinking
of an age that is passing would have focused that behavior on,
have given it a major reference to, have belittled its importance
by dealing with it as a phase of, those, merely verbal formulae:
precepts.
In his biography of Pound, Wigdor speaks of the conservative
streak in Pound's legal analysis in different terms. Beyond the
pragmatic instrumentalism in Pound's thought,42 one could find
a strong element of organicism akin to that found in nineteenth
century 3 social theory but also with roots in the evolutionary
38. 30 CoLUM. L. REv. 431 (1930); K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 3 (1962).

39. Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence,44 HARv. L. REV. 697 (1931).
40. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-Respondingto Dean Pound, 44 HARV.
L. REv. 1222 (1931); K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 42(1962). One should not misunderstand this dispute. Llewellyn found a vital insight missing in Pound's analysis of the law.
Pound was deeply disturbed by the skepticism of the legal realists. Yet the realists,
including particularly Llewellyn, acknowledged that Pound had profoundly influenced
their view of law.
41. K. LLEWELLYN, JURiSPRUDENCE 6, 7 (1962).
42. See POUND, pp. 183-206.
43. Id. at 212. Query whether that organicism reflects a proper concern with maintaining legal theory as a viable means of collaboration between legal decision makers and
with those who are to be governed by rules. Llewellyn shows a similar concern. See, e.g.,
K. LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADMON: DECMING APPEALS 291-94 (1960).
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botany to which Pound had devoted so much of his youth. According to Wigdor, the "common law tradition offered Pound a
familiar channel to organicism" 4 and the organicism which he
found in that tradition "competed with instrumentalism in a
relentless intellectual tug-of-war." 5 The reluctance to tear the
law's seamless web led Pound to hold a distaste for social legislation despite the radical reform flavor to his continual insistence
upon social engineering." While urging procedural reform he favored a gradual evolutionary development. Organicism for Pound
"established the boundaries within which instrumentalism could
operate"4 and hence "had serious consequences for Pound's intellectual development."4 Wigdor asserts that the ambivalence created in Pound's thought by the struggle between organicism and
instrumentalism prevented him from developing the great systematic approach to the common law that he had proposed.49
I prefer Llewellyn's critical explanation of Pound's inability
to produce his great systematic work. In his 1960 review of
Pound's five volume work, Jurisprudence, at a time long after
their earlier dispute, Llewellyn found the same greatness he had
seen in Pound at that earlier point and the same failure to achieve
a significant insight. In discussing Pound's analysis of G6ny in
that five volume work, he states:"
This is Pound's sniffer at work. It is an amazing sniffer. It
reminds me most of the general genius of the American case law
judge: most of the time it is amazingly on target.And so rarely
in the bull's eye. For Pound is of course not in the bull's eye here.
He recognizes the importance of technique, in general. But he
turns his back, then, on the craft aspect, the daily working
aspect for daily working lawyers, of this great M~thode of
G6ny's-even while, I repeat, he is sniffing out the greatness
which has been missed by almost every other American writer
except Cardozo. ...
Let me try to state it this way: Pound has contributed for
44.
45.
46.
47.

PouND, p. 211.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 231.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Llewellyn, Book Review, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 174 (1960); K.
JURISPRUDENCE 495 (1962).
51. K. LLEWELYN, JURISPRUDENCE 500,

LLEWELLYN,

501 (1962).
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my guess, more than any other individual (unless perhaps John
Dewey) to making legal thought in this country result-minded,
cause-minded, and process-minded. Yet such lines of thinking
leave little mark upon the whole, and almost no mark upon the
structure of these final volumes.
Llewellyn suggests that while Pound did not take readily to
analysis of process, methodology and craftsmanship-"of how
things work"-his genius was capable of meeting the need for
that type of analysis. As Pound advanced in age, however, his
preference for building theories of structure became predominate
2
in his thought.
Related to Llewellyn's emphasis on craftmanship, on behavior, on "how things are done," was his concern with men, with the
human element in law. "Behind decisions stand judges; judges
are men; as men they have human backgrounds." 3 Men also have
or lack vision. One concept offered by Llewellyn to describe a
judge's vision, "situation sense," is criticized by Twining.
After writing The Common Law Tradition, Llewellyn spoke
to the Conference of Chief Justices. 4 In the course of his speech
5
one can find a typical discussion of "situation sense":
As you size up the facts, try to look first for a significant
life-problem-situation into which they comfortably fit, and only
then let the particular equities begin to register; so that when
the particular equities do begin to bite, their bite is already
tempered by the quest for and feel for an appropriate rule that
flows from and fits into the significant situation type.
The notion of "situation sense" may work best in the context
of commercial law. From the time when Lord Mansfield with the
aid of his merchant jurors absorbed great segments of the law
merchant into the common law,5 commercial judges have sought
to understand the customs and practices of merchants. An experienced commercial lawyer who brings to the bench an understanding of typical business operations, arrangements and problems
may be able to recognize in the facts presented by disputing
52. Id. at 504.
53. Id. at 42.
54. Llewellyn, On the Current Recapture of the Grand Tradition, 9 U. CH. L.S.
REcoRD 6 (1960); K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 215 (1962).
55. K. LEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 222 (1962); see K. LLEWELLYN, THI COMMON LAW
TRADmON: DECIDING APPEALS 268 et seq. (1960).
56. See C. FIFooT, LORD MANSFIELD (1936).
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parties patterns with which he is familiar. The judge without
experience in commercial matters who seeks, perhaps with the
help of the advocates in the case, to see the facts as businessmen
might see them may be able to find more appropriate solutions
for the needs of the industry and the parties than if he sought to
resolve the dispute solely by applying abstract legal rules.5 7
While recognizing these aspects of "situation sense," Twining finds it an elusive and unclear concept.1 At times Llewellyn
uses "situation sense" to describe a faculty or ability to perceive
in the judge. On other occasions Llewellyn will ask one to seek
the sense of the problem-situation. In this use "situation sense"
seems immanent in the circumstances. It is unclear, then,
whether this term describes the judge's ability to perceive or a
pattern in the circumstances."
Again, to some "situation sense" will imply simply a valuefree acquaintance with the factual background, as a commercial
lawyer may know the business circumstances." Often "situation
sense" carries with it a policy or principle which implies a judgement of value." Twining argues that Llewellyn always used "situation sense" in relation to a principle or policy.2
The possibility that "situation sense" used to include a value
judgement describes not a perception of the judge but a pattern
immanent in the circumstances troubled Twining. 3 The suggestion "has a metaphysical ring of the sort that arouses the suspicion of empirically minded jurists."6 4 In order to avoid the "metaphysical" implications of "situation sense," Twining restates
Llewellyn's views on the use of "situation sense" in a passage
worth reproducing in a footnote.
57. Cf. LLEWELLYN, p. 225.
58. See id. at 269.
59. See id. at 220.
60. Id. at 221.
61. Id. at 222.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 224. It does not trouble me.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 226-27 (footnotes omitted). The "situation sense" is restated as follows:
Situation sense (summary)
Facts: (a) In interpreting a reported case, or in approaching a current case,
start by studying the facts as a layman familiar with their general context might
see them. Try to grasp what would have happened if things had been working
smoothly and what it was that brought the dispute about. Analyse what interests are in conflict and formulate statements of policy that may be relevant.
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Twining also remarks that "situation sense" "is most appropriately used in respect to disputes which arise within groups or
sub-groups which have an underlying consensus about relevant
values."66 In such circumstances acquaintance with the factual
background and the practices of the group will appropriately be
accompanied by familiarity with principles or policies accepted
by the group and reflected in its practices. These values understood in conjunction with the practices might be used reasonably
as a basis for resolving an intra-group dispute."
In my opinion this is one of the most important suggestions
made by Twining in his discussion of "situation sense" and I
(b) Try to fit the facts into some socially significant category or pattern,
separating clearly irrelevant 'fireside equities' peculiar to this case from potentially relevant elements in the situation. In seeking for appropriate categories
the following guidelines should be observed: (i) in categorizing the facts choose
'situational concepts'-i.e. categories which clearly refer to fact situations only
and do not straddle facts and legal consequences; (ii) terms used and distinctions drawn by persons familiar with the context of the dispute (either as experts, observers or participants) may provide appropriate categories; (iii) the
practices and expectations of such persons may also be of use; (iv) one aspect
of the problem is to characterize the facts at an appropriate level of generality.
No general formula exists for this but: (a) the facts should be characterized as
a type; (b) in first instance, the facts should be characterized fairly narrowly
(e.g. hospital employing a doctor rather than employer-employee) and movement up the ladder of abstraction to broader categories should proceed with
awareness of the dangers of lumping together disparate social situations under
one head.
Values: (a) Sometimes it will be found that after the facts have been categorized, there may be a consensus within the affected group or within society as a
whole respecting applicable policies or principles. In such cases the selection of
an appropriate situational concept may be sufficient to resolve the problem.
(b) In other instances, a conflict of principles or policies may be found.
In such cases the process of categorization should have assisted in identification
of the issues of policy, etc. but will not in itself resolve such conflict. However,
even if reasonable men might disagree on the choice of conflicting policies, they
might share common ground in limiting the range of choices.
•Measures: (a) Determine what you consider to be the most appropriate line or
direction of treatment and only then; (b) decide on what specific prescription
is appropriate.
This procedure provides no cure-all for finding 'appropriate' categories or
choosing between competing values. 'No technique or method can ever be a
cure-all'. It will not assist in the disposition of marginal cases. Nevertheless it
provides a broad framework which should maximize the role of reason in solving
problems presented to appellate courts.
66. Id. at 226.
67. But query whether a knowledge of mercantile practices provides an appropriate
background standing by itself for resolution of a dispute between a consumer and a
merchant.
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propose to use it as the starting point for counterpointing 5 his
analysis. One acquires "situation sense" primarily from a lived
experience within a group." It is the understanding that one acquires from that learning experience of group values and patterns
of behavior. But it is not confined to that factual content. It will
include learned skills at relating to the group and at resolving
problems in a manner satisfactory to the group. It will also include a ready appreciation of the manner in which some seemingly isolated circumstances will fit into the patterns of the
group's behavior.
A model of one who has "situation sense" is the former commercial lawyer who has long represented clients in a particular
industry. As a judge confronted with a dispute arising from that
industry, that experienced practitioner will recognize the context
of the dispute and may say to himself, "I know what is going on
there" and thus arrive quickly at a resolution. 7° In circumstances
such as these, Jerome Frank's use of "gestalt" 7' and Hutcheson's
use of "hunching" 72 are related to "situation sense."
68. By "counterpointing" here I mean to bring out overlooked aspects of "situation
sense." I do not mean to produce an alternative restatement. However, certain ways of
developing the notion of "situation sense" which do not find precise echoes in Llewellyn,
as for example developments from Twining's valuable suggestion regarding groups and
"situation sense," deserve comment.
69. Cf. LLEWELLYN, p. 503, where Llewellyn defines "horse sense" as "that extraordinary and uncommon kind of experience, sense, and intuition which was characteristic of
an old-fashioned skilled horse trader in his dealings either with horses or with other horse
traders."
70. Cf. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 CoLuri. L. REv. 699, 699702 (1936). Llewellyn's discussion of the English Judge, Thomas Edward Scrutton, poses
a concrete example of this.
71. See J. FRANK, CouRTs ON TRIAL, 165-85 (1950), particularly 170-71, 175-79.
72. Hutcheson, The Judgement Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
Decision, 14 CORNELL L. Q. 274 (1929). Judge Hutcheson states:
Repeatedly, when one is hard beset, there are principles and precedents and
analogies which may be pressed into the service of justice, if one has the perceiving eye to use them. It is not unlike the divinations of the scientist. His experiments must be made significant by the flash of a luminous hypothesis. For the
creative process in law, and indeed in science generally, has a kinship to the
creative process in art. Imagination, whether you call it scientific or artistic, is
for each the faculty that creates.
Id. at 281.
Compare K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMON LAW TRADITrON: DECIDING APPEALs 121 n.154
(1960) where Llewellyn comments:
Hutcheson on "the little small dice" can be read only by a moron as suggesting gambling probabilities. His insistence is on the frequent determinative
character of factors not as yet reduced to formula or to any other diagnosis which
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While the primary model of "situation sense" is understanding acquired by a lived experience within a group, one can by
analogy employ "situation sense" in other circumstances. A judge
whose practice was largely in negligence law may seek out the
sense of a commercial situation. Ideally he would acquire that
sense through a period of experience with commercial problems
and those involved in them. Like Lord Mansfield he would cultivate the acquaintance of merchants and learn from them. In
other words he would reproduce deliberately, albeit in a more
limited way, the lived experience of the commercial lawyer. In the
actual flow of a court's work, however, that careful cultivation of
commercial experience may be difficult. As a substitute a skilled
judge with the aid of experienced and knowledgable advocates
who are commercial lawyers may acquire the sense of a commercial situation from briefs and oral argument. 73 By descriptions of
behavior patterns those briefs and oral arguments may in a limited and vicarious way carry the judge through a lived learning
experience with a group or industry. After diligent effort the judge
may then see the sense of the situation and acquire the "gestalt"
or lightning "hunch" of which Jerome Frank and Hutcheson
speak. In this analogous use, the judge does not originally have
''situation sense" but rather seeks out the sense of the situation.
He is seeking patterns74 of facts and related values75 and in addition some understanding of appropriate ways of solving problems
within the group. 71 In a more remote analogy a skilled judge who
knows how to seek the sense of a strange situation may be said
to have "situation sense." 77
In the two analogous uses of the term "situation sense," the
judge seeks to understand the behavior and values of particular
groups of which he is not a member. The judge, then, moves from
what might be described as his own "horizon" or "frame" to
is communicable by more than such terms as "hunch" or "insight" or "something"-all used in terms of responsible conscience and tradition.
73. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADIMON: DEcmINo APPEALS 201-13, 23236 (1960).
74. Llewellyn continually insisted upon patterns and categories. See id. at 122, 20102, 268; compare K. LLEwELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 32 (1962); K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE
BUSH 48 (1951).
75. See LLEWELLYN, p. 222.
76. Cf. K. LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADMON: DEcmING, APPEALs 201 (1960)
(horse sense).
77. Id. at 268.
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another "horizon" or "frame." 7 8 When adjudicating a dispute between members of differing groups such as "merchants" and
"consumers" the judge may take care to move into the horizons
of both groups and to search out the sense of the situation within
both frames.79
A further use of "situation sense" may be found by analyzing
certain techniques used in drafting and suggested for interpreting
the Uniform Commercial Code.
The Code
Llewellyn's great non-philosophic achievement, the Uniform
Commercial Code, nevertheless grew (organically?) in many respects from his philosophical insights. The sections of the UCC
on risk 0 are a classic illustration. Under the Uniform Sales Act
the determination of who bore the risk of loss and indeed of a
range of other questions would turn on a finding that title or
property in the goods had or had not passed.8 1 In the complexity
of modern business circumstances it was often difficult to determine when title had passed. Courts developed a patchwork of
decisions purportedly applying the abstract notion of title or own2
ership of the goods.
The legal realists in what I would describe as their critical
mode doubted the ability to predict court decisions on the basis
of such classic "paper rules" 3 as the Sales Act principle which
78. Cf. id. at 268. The words, frame and horizon, are imposed on Llewellyn because
they seem helpful in treating the problem raised by Twining. They are terms frequently
used by philosophers such as Martin Heidegger or Bernard Lonergan. See, e.g., M. HEDEGGER, IDENrT AND DIFFERENCE 13, 14, 34, 35 (1969); D. TRACY, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF
BERNARD LONERGAN 1-21, 104-32 (1970). Although the words have complex uses, in this
context they may have the quality of "singing reason," to use one of Llewellyn's favorite
terms. One brought up in San Francisco has a different horizon than one brought up in
New York City. So too a commercial lawyer has a different horizon than a negligence trial
lawyer. Their views of life may be partially framed by such technical terms as "the
prudent man" or "unconscionability," as well as by experience with their different clients.
79. In most passages in regard to "situation sense" cited above from THE COMMON
LAW TRADrriON: DECIDING APPEALS, the judge is moving into an unfamiliar horizon. One
aspect of the counterpointing of Twining's restatement of "situation sense" is an elucidation of the manner in which this may be done.
80. UCC §§ 2-509,-510.
81. Uniform Sales Act §§ 17, 19, 22.
82. See J. WHrrE & R. SUMhImRS, UNIFORM COmMERCIAL CODE 135-37 (1972).
83. K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 23-27, 56-57. Llewellyn states the following atti-

tude of legal realists:
(7) The belief in the worthwhileness of grouping cases and legal situations
into narrower categories than has been the practice in the past. This is con-
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based risk of loss on passage of title in the goods.84 Llewellyn, with
his early and continuing concern with increasing the predictability of.court decisions, suggested that narrow categories be substituted for such general principles.
A simple carryover from the critical to the creative mode of
legal realism can be seen in the manner in which the drafters of
the UCC changed this older rule and replaced it with the provisions of § 2-509. In that section, the general principle of the Sales
Act is replaced by a variety of particular rules which rest upon
easily ascertainable concrete phenomena, 6 such as the rule in
UCC § 2-509(3) that risk of loss passes from the merchant seller
to the buyer when the buyer receives physical possession"7 of the
goods.
A second technique was employed in drafting that rule. Soia
Mentschikoff describes it in the introduction to5 her case book,
Commercial Transactions, Cases and Materials:
The most important drafting concept rests on the belief
that relative certainty and uniformity of construction depend on
the court's perception of the situation represented by the rule
and the reason the rule was adopted and that proper construction follows the reason and is limited or extended by it. The
attempt, therefore, has been to draft rules so that both the situation being covered and its reason tend to appear on the face of
the language, and to keep the language reasonably openended. 9
As Twining states, then, the "'rule with a singing reason'
was the basic model for the draftsmen." 0 The reason was to appear on the face of the rule but in relation to a simple type
situation. The judge using elementary "situation sense" was expected to perceive the situation, the rule, and the reason for the
nected with the distrust of verbally simple rules-which so often cover dissimilar
and non-simple fact situations....
Id. at 56-57.
84. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U.L. REv. 159
(1938).
85. See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 137 (1972).
86. See LLEWELLYN, pp. 331-33.

87. The word "receipt" in UCC § 2-509(3) is defined by UCC § 2-103(1)(c) as "taking
physical possession."
88. S. MENTSCHIKOFF, COMMERcIAL TRANSACTIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS (1970).
89. Id. at 6.
90. LLEWELLYN, p. 324.
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rule in the situation. 91

For example, in UCC § 2-509(3), the simple type situation is
the normal sale by a merchant seller to a buyer who takes undisputed physical possession of the goods either in the seller's place
of business or at the time of delivery. There is no authorization
to ship by carrier and no use of a bailee. The rule that risk passes
upon physical receipt is designed to place risk on the one who is
best able to control the goods and the most likely to insure. 9
Fortunately or unfortunately life does not accommodate itself to such simple solutions. There are cases in which the buyer
may or may not have had physical possession of the goods. In one
case93 a helicopter crashed while the buyer accompanied by the
seller's instructor was flying it during a training course conducted
at the seller's airfield. Soia Mentchikoff in such circumstances
would recommend a construction technique akin to the drafting
technique described earlier: 94
If it is correct that the grand style of appellate judging involved
looking at the situation before the court in terms of its type
situation and arriving at a conclusion as to what is the best
policy, then if you look at the precise language of the statute and
at the situation before you and the reason for the language
seems to be present in the situation, you can expand by analogy
or, if the reason is absent, limit the statutory language. This is
a perfectly permissible reasoning by analogy with the statutes
instead of with cases; the same principle exactly. You say to
yourself, "This is the reason for the rule which is enunciated

here; the explicit language does not cover the situation which
has arisen, should I apply the policy? Are the situations sufficiently similar so that the reasons that make this a good policy
in the situation covered precisely by the language should carry
over to the situation which is not precisely covered by the language?"
Where the reason for the rule does not apply to the situation
then the court is permitted to refuse to apply it without distorting
the statutory language. 5 "Situation sense" then was employed in
91. This is an example of the expected perception of value accompanying perception
of the situation.
92. UCC § 2-509, Comment 3.
93. Ellis v. Bell Aerospace Corp., 315 F. Supp. 221 (D. Ore. 1970).
94. S. MENTSCHIOFF, COMMERcAL TRANSACTIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS 11 (1970).
95. Id.
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drafting the Code and may be used when interpreting it."
It is worth noting, on the basis of this discussion, that the
Code was drafted with a view to the problems a judge would have
in applying its sections to the vast range of fact situations which
would arise over time and in many different industries. The Code
is drafted not only to set forth in statutory rules certain appropriate social solutions97 but with a view to further creation of solutions by judges interpreting its provisions. It provides guidance
to the craftmanship of judges seeking to understand and resolve
human problems. It is an example of the manner in which the
critical concern of legal realism with the behavior of judges was
transformed into a creative concern for the craftmanship of the
judiciary.
English Analysis and American Legal Realism
While Twining discusses the use of "situation sense" in
drafting the Uniform Commercial Code,9" he misses the relation
between techniques used in drafting and recommended for interpreting the Code and the legal realists' concern with practices,
behavior and craftsmanship. 9 The difficulties which Twining
admittedly has with "situation sense" may be traceable to the
influence of analytic thought in his legal background. Nevertheless this influence of analytic philosophy provides one of the valuable aspects of his biography of Llewellyn.
It is possible to read portions of H.L.A. Hart's The Concept
of Law'" as an effort to incorporate the insights of legal realism
into analytic thought."' Twining's biography of Llewellyn could
be understood as a continuation of that worthy endeavor.92 Unfortunately the great concern of the analytic school with language, concepts and rules may interfere with an understanding
96. See LLEWELLYN, pp. 324-26.
97. Comparethe discussion of the Pound-Llewellyn controversy in the text accompanying notes 38-41 supra.

98. See LLEWELLYN, pp. 324-26, 331-33.
99. See id. Twining catches the relation between the critical concern with overbroad
categories and the use of narrow categories in some instances in the Code. He does not
extensively discuss the Code as a tool designed to be used in decision making by judges
employing "situation sense" in the manner described in passages quoted from Soia Ments-

chikoff.
100. H.L.A. HART, THE CONcEPr o' LAW (1961).
101. See, e.g., id. at 121-50, particularly the discussion of the open texture of law.
102. See LLEWELLYN, pp. vii, 8, 385-87; see also W. PROBERT, LAW LANGUAGE AND
COMMUNATION

(1972) which is influenced by both traditions of thought.
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of behavior, craftmanship, and human vision. For example,
H.L.A. Hart offers a concept of a legal system as a union of
primary rules of obligation and secondary rules (of recognition,
change, and adjudication) about primary rules.'0 3 Under one
reading this concept could be understood as an attempt to incorporate process, behavior and craftmanship into a model of a legal
system. If it is such, then Llewellyn's comment about Pound
seems pertinent: 104
Only a man gifted with insight would have added ... such an
element of practices, of habits and techniques of action, of
behavior. But only a man partially caught in the traditional
precept-thinking of an age that is passing would have focused
that behavior on, have given it a major reference to, have belittled its importance by dealing with it as phase of, those merely
verbal formulae: precepts.
Twining has made a great and largely successful effort to work
himself into the horizon of the legal realists. His background in
English analysis, however, may blur his vision of the human elements in law which became important to the legal realists." 5
Conclusion
Neither Pound nor Llewellyn were willing to confine their
understanding of law within a definition.' 6 In his robust old age
Pound would explain this in words such as the following: "Some
think that law is economics, and there is a great deal to be said
for this; others think that law is ethics; and some think that law
is social engineering. They are all wrong. Law is all of these.' ' 07
Perhaps this unwillingness to confine their thought, this fas103. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 91-96 (1961).
104. K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 7 (1962).
105. By this I mean their concern with the perception and craftsmanship of the judge
and their corresponding concern that judges understand others and their life-situations.
Both aspects are reflected in the discussion of "situation sense" above. Legal Realists, first
concerned with predicting what judges would do, studied judges, discovered their human
dimension and incorporated that discovery into their understanding of law. It is their most
important step beyond the sociological jurisprudence of Pound. It is more than a contribution to the philosophy of law. It has affected their understanding of legal craftsmanship
and the drafting of the Uniform Commerical Code which was designed to be interpreted
by judges with human perception facing a variety of commercial situations in which
humans relate to each other in a variety of ways.
106. K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 1-6 (1962).

107. This is what I remember of an explanation which Pound gave me (and surely
others) during a visit to his office in the early 1960's.
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cination with the multiplicity of relations between society,

human life and law is both the strength of Pound and Llewellyn
and in the final analysis the obstacle which prevented them from
developing a more systematic analysis of their thought. Yet together in overlapping sequence and of course with the aid of many
other thinkers, Pound and Llewellyn have moved our understanding of law from the horizon of the late nineteenth century to the
more open view of the present. Both have enabled us to use law
as a flexible tool for the accomplishment of social purpose. Beyond that one may advance as a tentative suggestion that Llewellyn's greatest contribution was to make us see the human element
in the legal process and to provide us with such tools as "situation
sense" to describe the thought of a human judge seeking to understand human problems. '
Both biographies are useful and worth reading. Indeed,
Twining's biography is a splendid achievement. It is interesting,
however, that neither biography is written by an American lawyer. Perhaps that is a reflection of the enormous strength of
American lawyering, its concern with doing, and one of its weaknesses, a reluctance to theoretically analyze that doing."' 0
108. See note 105 supra.
109. To some extent one can make the same remark concerning Pound and Llewellyn.
One also ought to apply to both the closing comment in Llewellyn's review (Llewellyn,
Book Review, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 174, 182 (1960)) of Pound's five volume work on jurisprud-

ence (K. LLEWELLYN,

JURISPRUDENc.

504 (1962)), "Ave Caesar" and add "attque vale."
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CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT. By
David Caplovitz.* New York: The Free Press. 1974. Pp. xiv, 352.
$10.95.
Reviewed by Robert J. Egan**
A 1973 staff report of the New York Regional Office of the
Federal Trade Commission stated:'
Debt Collection is a pivotal aspect of the control of consumer
fraud. If fraudulent operators are unable to collect their bills,
they would go out of business. On the other hand, if consumers
can be compelled to pay even if they are cheated, fraud is perpetuated. Unfair collection practices injure both legitimate
business and the public.

One of the sorry conclusions of David Caplovitz' book,
Consumers in Trouble, is that our present legal system is too
frequently and too easily a tool of creditors who utilize high pressure tactics and deceptive practices to sell their wares, and the
law to collect their debts. This work probes deeply into the questions surrounding why consumers default, examines how effective
various debt collection procedures are in assuring payment, and
explores whether such procedures comply with basic conceptions
of due process and fairness. The study concludes that the cards
are stacked against consumer debtors.
Consumers in Trouble deals with a sample of 1,331 debtors
whose names were obtained from the court records of four cities,
New York, Chicago, Detroit and Philadelphia. The underlying
transaction which gave rise to the litigation in each instance dealt
either with the sale of merchandise or the making of a personal
loan. Service contracts were excluded. The cities in the survey
were selected for a variety of reasons. New York,2 for example,
* Presently a Professor of Sociology at Hunter College of the City University of New
York, Dr. Caplovitz is also the author of several other books dealing with consumer credit.
** Deputy Commissioner, New York City Department of Consumer Affairs. B.S.
Georgetown University, 1957; M.A. Yale University, 1958; LL.B. Yale University, 1961.
1. Federal Trade Commission, New York Regional Office, Staff Report on Debt
Collection Hearings, at p. 2 (April, 1973). A copy is on file in the office of the Hofstra Law
Review.
2. The sample for New York City is drawn solely from the records of the Civil Court
in New York County (Manhattan). P.324. Therefore, in certain categories of consumer
transactions the results for New York may not be truly representative of the city as a
whole. For example, the New York sample contains fewer automobile sales transactions
than the other three cities. This might not have been the case had figures for all five
counties that comprise New York City been used.
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was included because, among other things, service of process
there is left in large measure to professional process servers.3 Furthermore, New York's relatively liberal income execution statute4
juxtaposed with Michigan's stringent garnishment law made it
possible to determine the effect of such laws on consumer debt
collection with some precision. Philadelphia helped to complete
this picture because Pennsylvania is one of two states which does
not allow garnishment.6
The interviews used in the study took place during 1967. The
sample was divided into three income categories. Those with an
income in excess of $8,000,1 those with an income ranging from
$4,000 to $8,000 and those with incomes below $4,000. Persons
with incomes in the $4,000 to $7,000 range made up approximately 54% of the total sample with the other two categories
being approximately equal in size. This breakdown somewhat
approximates the ratio of installment credit users in the general
population.' The debtors in the sample were mostly young per3. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2103(a) (McKinney 1963), which provides, with some exceptions, that anyone over the age of eighteen who is not a party to the litigation can serve
process within the state. Provision is made for service by the sheriff, and in certain
instances there is a distinct advantage in using the sheriff. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 203 (b) (5)
(McKinney 1972). In New York City, anyone who serves process as a business is required,
pursuant to Local Law 80 of 1969, N.Y.C. ADniN. CODE § B32-451.0 et seq. (1972) to obtain
a process server license issued by the city's Department of Consumer Affairs. The statute
states that anyone who serves five or more process in any year is deemed to be in the
business of process serving.
4. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5231(b) (McKinney Supp. 1974). New York excludes the first $85
of weekly income and limits garnishment to 10 percent of eligible wages.
5. The MICHIGAN LAwYER's MANuAL states:
Garnishment is the one area of the law of Michigan where the creditor is given
much of a break. . . . Garnishment is much broader in Michigan than in other
states.
MICHIGAN LAwyER's MANUAL § G4.01, at 42 (1964). Under Michigan law, garnishment
takes 60 percent of eligible wages and exempts a maximum of the first $50 of income on
the first garnishment if the period of labor is one week or less, and $90 if the period is
longer than a week. Mich. C.L.A. § 600.7501 (1968). See Mich. C.L.A. § 600.4011 et seq.
(1968) (garnishment in the circuit court); MICH. C.L. § 600.7501 et seq. (1968) (garnishment in a justice court) and MICH. C.L. § 600.8306 (Supp. 1974) (garnishment in a district
court).
6. Wage garnishments are prohibited in Pennsylvania and Texas. Tax. Rav. Civ.
STAT., art. 4099 (1966). The original Pennsylvania statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 886,
was recently suspended in connection with a revision of the Pennsylvania Justice Courts
(Acts 1972, No. 271, § 1, Approved November 15, 1972). See PA. R.C.J.P. Rule 481 (15),
but the exception for wages was preserved. PA. R.C.J.P. Rule 482 (12), n.(d).
7. In most instances, where the family income exceeded $8,000, the study revealed
that such income was derived from multiple sources. Either more than one member of the
family was employed or one wage earner held more than one job. See p. 16.
8. The statistics in the book were compared by Caplovitz with statistics developed
at approximately the same time by the National Opinion Research Council [NORC] on
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sons employed mainly in lower blue collar occupations. Most were
frequently out of work and were found to have had a lower educational attainment than members of the general population, or for
that matter other credit users. The number of black and Hispanic
persons in the sample was substantially higher than the percentages of those ethnic groups in the overall population of the cities
studied. Whites in the sample were closer in income and occupation to the black and Hispanic members of the sample than they
were to whites and blacks in the general population.
The creditors in the study were also carefully examined. The
sales transactions were broken down into four categories - direct
sales (door-to-door), automobile sales, sales made by low-income
retailers and sales made by general retailers. Lenders were divided into banks, small loan companies and credit unions. The
direct seller and the small loan company were the type of creditor
that appeared most frequently in the cases examined.2 The black
credit users. The figures, expressed in percent form are as follows:
Debtors in
Caplovitz Study
NORC
Under $4,000
$4,000 - $7,999
$8,000 and over

24
54
22

20
43
37

9. Broken down on the basis of type of lender, the data showed the following:
Lending Institution

Debtors in Study
(in percent)

Bank
Small Loan Co.
Credit Union

32
60
8

The figures on banks may be skewed by the New York figures where banks accounted
for more litigation than in the other three cities combined. This is probably due in large
part to very liberal personal loan policy of the city's largest bank, First National City. See
note 2 supra.
With regard to type of seller the data showed the following:
Debtors In Study
(in percent)
Type of Seller
Direct Seller
Auto dealer
Low-income retailer
General retailer
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and Hispanic debtors most particularly were the subject of suits
brought by direct sellers."
Having determined who the debtors were and of whom they
most frequently ran afoul, the study moved on to analyze the
borrower's reasons for defaulting. Approximately 80 percent of
those surveyed conceded that some act of their own was responsible for their trouble, with 79 percent giving some factor in their
own lives such as loss of income or a sudden serious problem, as
the first reason for their having gone into default." However,
about 27 percent of those surveyed gave as at least one reason for
their default, some improper action on the part of the creditor
and over 20 percent gave such creditor action as their first reason. 2 As might be anticipated from the debtors involved, nearly
half were driven into default by a loss of income. Where the
debtors gave as a reason for defaulting some act or omission of
the creditor, the largest percentage claimed fraud and deception
Again, New York may to some extent skew these results. New York was the lowest in
the auto sales category with a figure that was almost one third that of the next lowest city
(11 percent as contrasted with 29 percent). The author states that this may be due to the
use of Manhattan statistics only. See note 2 supra. For further detailed figures on lenders,
see p. 31, Table 3.2, and for detailed figures on types of sellers, see p. 33, Table 3.3.
10. Direct sellers accounted for 64 percent of the actions brought by sellers against
blacks as contrasted with only 50 percent of the actions brought against whites. P. 43,
Table 3.9. As to lenders, blacks in the study accounted for 74 percent of the small loan
company borrowings as opposed to whites who accounted for only 47 percent. The complete figures are as follows:
Blacks
Whites
(percent)
(percent)
Lender
Banks
Small Loan Co.
Credit Union

45
47
8

18
74
8

11. The reasons mentioned in the book as reflecting debtor mishaps and shortcomings
included loss of income, voluntary overextension, involuntary overextension, marital instability, debtor's third party responsibilities (such as acting as a co-signer) and debtor
irresponsibility-the "dead beat". Voluntary overextension as used in the book refers to
a situation in which the debtor has voluntarily incurred excessive obligations in relation
to his income, and a sudden reversal, such as a loss of income, has driven him into default.
In an involuntary overextension, the debtor has a manageable debt burden, but an unanticipated reversal pushes the debtor into financial difficulty. The debtors in the study were
interviewed, and their reasons for defaulting were broken down into categories. The interviews then attempted to break the reasons down into a primary reason, a secondary reason
and a tertiary reason. These categories were in turn divided into two groupings-those
classified as debtor mishaps and those which in some way implicated the creditor. The
classification scheme is described in chapter 4, pp. 49-55. The findings are set out in
tabular form at p. 53, Table 4.1.
12. See pp. 54-55, Table 4.2.
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as such reason with such causes as misunderstanding or a return
of merchandise accounting for only a small part of this group. 13
The results of that part of the study which followed the debtors into court strongly supports the conclusion that our present
system is heavily slanted in favor of the creditor. Though over 20
percent of the debtors listed as a primary reason for their default
a problem involving the creditors' actions and approximately 27
percent listed such conduct as a reason for defaulting," only two
percent of those who went to trial achieved a result seen as favora15
ble to the consumer.
The indictment of our present legal system contained in this
13. The reasons given for defaulting which implicated the creditor broke down as
follows:
First Reason
for Default
Total Reasons
Reason
(percent)
(percent)
Fraud, Deception
14
14
Payment misunderstanding
7
6
Partial late payment

-

5

Item returned for credit
a
2
Harassment by creditor
1
Miscellaneous
1
a
A word about the two columns. The first column shows the percentage of debtors surveyed
who gave the reason shown as the first reason for defaulting. The second column indicates
the percent each reason has of the total reasons given in all categories by the debtors
surveyed. Bear in mind that this includes both those reasons which involve the debtor as
well as those that implicate the creditor; it also involves situations where the reason may
have been given as a second or third reason. For example, a debtor may consider that a
primary reason for his default is the loss of his job but he may also consider it unfair that
after having made a partial payment, the creditor still proceeded to sue and thus he gives
this as a secondary or tertiary reason. The use of "a" signifies a percentage less than half
of one percent. See p.53, Table 4.1.
14. See note 12 supra.
15. P. 222. The overwhelming number of the cases won by creditors were won on a
default judgment basis. Defaults accounted for over 90 percent of the creditor judgments,
id., and though this in part may be due to defective service of process, other factors must
also be considered. Increased consumer education as to rights in a law suit, the greater
availability of legal resources and the use of such devices as a "tear off answer" (a detachable portion of the summons which allows the consumer to enter an appearance and
answer in the case by simply checking off an appropriate defense and mailing it into the
clerk of the court) are all possible approaches to dealing with the problem. An analysis of
default judgments in the New York area which was prepared by the New York Regional
Consumer Protection Council concluded:
Lack of legal advice and assistance is probably the most pervasive and serious
problem for consumer defendants and the most direct cause of the high rate of
default judgments.
E. NOVACK, REPORT OF THE DEFAULT JuDGMENr STUDY 94 (1973). A copy is on file in the
office of the Hofstra Law Review.
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study focuses not only on the deficiencies of the law, but also on
those in the overall system. It discusses, for example, the harassing phone call and the insulting letter from the collection attorney." In all, 59 percent of the debtors in the study had been
subjected to some form of harassment as part of the creditor's
debt collection efforts. It is unfortunate that the study did not
measure how effective this unscrupulous technique is in coercing
debtors into settling their debts even where a good defense exists.
In a time when Watergate has raised serious questions about the
day-to-day ethics of the bar, surely this is an area where grievance
committees might cast an investigative eye.
The study also raises the issue of the short supply of lawyers
to handle cases such as those of the debtors in this study. Here
the author focuses much of his attention on the status of class
action legislation and pays relatively little heed to means directed at increasing the supply of lawyers to bring or defend
actions where the amount of the recovery involved is relatively
small. This is an odd omission when one of the correlations of
the study is between the amount of the claim and the fact that
a lawyer was retained. As could be anticipated, the smaller the
claim, the less likely it is that a lawyer is involved, even where
the debtor believes there is a good reason not to pay. Legal services programs across the country continue to receive less than
adequate funding, 7 and an important segment of the organized
bar continues its resistance to the development of prepaid legal
services programs.18 In New York, efforts persist to achieve a class
16. With its usual precision and attention to detail, the book sets out in tabular form
various types of harassment and their frequency by city. See p. 182, Table 10.1.
17. The reference to legal services programs here means those programs funded in
whole or in substantial part by the Office of Economic Opportunity, pursuant to the
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. 2809 (a)(3)(1974). These services are to
be taken over by the new Legal Services Corporation, created by 42 U.S.C.A. 2996 et seq.
(Supp. 1975). Regarding the inadequate funding of legal services programs, one recent
commentary on legal services problems has concluded:
Thus, the program [legal services] received only one-third of the funds it originally requested and only one half of the financial support that the OEO Director
felt was adequate.
Comment, Legal Services-Past and Present, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 960, 968 (1974).
18. The position of the American Bar Association on the question of prepaid legal
services has changed significantly over the last twelve to eighteen months. In February
1974 at its Houston convention, the ABA adopted a series of amendments to the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility (the "Code") which would have severely impeded the development of prepaid plans, most particularly those using closed panels. See N.Y. Times, May
15, 1974, at 24, col. 3. These amendments were the work of the General Practice Section,
a section of the ABA composed primarily of single practitioners and members of small
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action statute which could provide consumers with an opportunity to go on the offensive with their problems rather than being
left the dangerous option of raising questions of fraud and misrepresentation as defenses in an action brought by a creditor for
non-payment. 9 What is the benefit of legislation that creates new
rights which cannot be exercised effectively? The effects of such
creditor remedies as garnishment, repossession and the deficiency
judgment are also considered. In each instance the effect of these
remedies goes well beyond simply making the creditor whole
again. Eight percent of all debtors in the study subject to garnishment lost their jobs. Many of the debtors who had merchandise
repossessed found that when it was sold it brought only a fraction
of what they had paid. Thus they not only lost their possessions,
but they were left with a sizable debt as well.
Caplovitz continually probes the data seeking to determine
what correlations exist between widely varying factors. How do
experiences with direct sellers relate to the ethnic background of
the debtor, or his education? How do debtors first find out that
their problem has now been taken to court? Surprisingly, close to
30 percent discover it initially by some means other than being
served with appropriate process in the action. Caplovitz also
traces the effect of the debtors' financial problems on their personal lives, and seeks to measure the strain consumer problems
place upon family life.
firms. The General Practice Section amendments had been introduced as amendments
to amendments to the Code prepared by the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (the "Standing Committee"). The Standing Committee's recommendations were considered by proponents of prepaid programs to be both fair and flexible and, if adopted, would have encouraged the development of such programs. The so
called Houston Amendments were decried by consumer groups around the country and
in August, 1974 the ABA appointed a committee to review these amendments. At its
convention held in Chicago in February, 1975, the ABA House of Delegates adopted new
amendments more consistent with those originally recommended by the Standing
Committee. See 61 ABA Journal 465 (April, 1975). It is hoped that the most recent
position of the ABA represents the direction in which it will continue to head with regard
to prepaid legal services programs.
19. A detailed report in support of a meaningful class action statute was submitted
in 1973 by the Special Committee on Consumer Affairs of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York. See Proposed ClassAction Legislation in New York, 28 RECORD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 481 (1973). In the 1974 session, a great effort was made by consumer groups
to bring pressure on the legislature to pass legislation beneficial to the consumer in this
area. Two bills were introduced on the matter in that session, one beneficial to consumers
and one not. The usual result followed, with both bills dying in committee. For a brief
description of the fate of class action legislation in the 1974 legislature, see COIUNrvTY
SERvic SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGISLATION IN NEW YORK STATE
(1974).
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The book's greatest value rests in this carefully compiled and
painstakingly analyzed data. The book's shortcomings are easily
visible and frequently conceded by the author. The study was
conducted in 1967, prior to the adoption of certain major consumer legislation and the decisions in several major cases."0 It is
also prior to the wide scale expansion of the bank credit card
system which has had a very decided impact upon consumer
credit.2" The data collected was drawn solely from consumers, and
no effort was made to check the answers with either lenders and
sellers or government and private organizations working with consumers. This is so even though the book does discuss such subjective categories for default as billing errors, misunderstanding as
to the nature of the debt, and litigation commenced after the
debtor believed that the debt was cancelled or a new payment
schedule had been arranged.22 The debtors were all urban resi20. Certainly the most decisive piece of federal consumer legislation is the Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (Supp. 1974), which embodies such concepts as truth-in-lending, fair credit reporting and a limit on the actions that can be taken
by an employer of a garnisheed worker.
In the area of litigation, two major cases were decided which curbed creditor remedies
substantially, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. 337 (1969) and Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67(1972). A decision in the last term of the Court, however, has
seriously undercut the holding in Fuentes. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. 416 U.S. 600
(1974). In addition, there have been decisions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act which
have hedged an employer's ability to discharge workers for garnishment. See Johnson v.
Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971) and Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674
(8th Cir. 1974).
There have also been developments at the state and local levels. New York, for
instance, has severely restricted the availability of the doctrine of the holder in due course.
In 1969 the City of New York pursuant to Local Law 68 of 1968 NEw YORK Crrv CHARTER
§ 2201 (1972), formed the City's Department of Consumer Affairs, and by subsequent
legislation has given it a broad grant of authority to deal with fraud, deception and
unconscionable practices in the marketplace. Many other local jurisdictions have now
established consumer protection agencies, and though these agencies vary greatly in power
and responsibility, by and large they have made a distinct contribution to consumer
protection.
21. Since 1965, installment credit provided through commercial bank credit cards has
almost doubled, going from $4,166,000,000 to $7,846,000,000. According to a Federal Reserve Board report, as of November, 1974, credit cards represented the second largest area
of consumer credit held by commercial banks, ranking behind only automobile paper, and
thus represented close to 10 percent of all bank consumer credit transactions. 61 Federal
Reserve Bulletin A47 (January 1975).
22. To lawyers trained in the adversary system, such ex parte statements are immediately suspect. However, the author dedicates a separate appendix section, Appendix B,
(pp. 317-21) to deal with this question. It must be kept in mind that the study seeks to
establish trends and patterns, and therefore the accuracy of any one person's statement
is less relevant. The likelihood that substantial numbers of persons, unknown to each
other, and located in different cities would tell the same contrived story is sufficiently
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dents and were located in cities in the northern part of the country, either in the east or the midwest. The author at one point
suggests that where creditor and debtor know each other or have
established lines of communications, such difficulties as those
encountered by the debtors in the study would not arise.2S It
would have been interesting to have had this thesis tested. It
would also have been valuable to have had some correlations
based upon sex developed; e.g., to what extent do laws that make
husbands responsible for the debts of their wives effect default?;
to what extent do the problems that single women have in obtaining credit force them into the hands of high pressure "easy credit"
retailers? But these omissions do not undermine the substantial
body of work that Caplovitz and his staff have done.
Debtors defaulting on their obligations represent only a small
fraction of the credit using consumer population. In the Caplovitz
study defaulting debtors represented about two percent of all
consumers using credit, and though there has been a steady increase in such defaults since 1967, consumer loans in default still
represent less than three percent of the total dollar volume of all
such loans.24 Of this small fraction of defaulting debtors, only a
small portion constitutes what sellers and lenders would classify
as a "dead beat"-someone who has no real intention of meeting
his lawful obligations." Many, though overextended, continued
to meet their obligations until some sudden calamity such as
illness, unemployment or family problems made it impossible.
Even in these circumstances many attempted to work out some
way to meet their obligations."
In his conclusions, Caplovitz poses several traditional as well
remote to provide a safeguard. Also supplanting the study's accuracy is the fact that many

of the conclusions are inherently plausible and frequently, as in the case of debtors overwhelmingly blaming themselves for their defaults, against the debtors' interests.
23. Pp. 131-32.

24. According to the Statistical Abstract of the United States, at about the time of
the Caplovitz study, the default rate on consumer credit transactions was 1.82 percent and
was projected at 2.70 percent for 1974. See STATISTmCAL ABSTAcr

OF THE

UNTrED STATES

461, table no. 744. Delinquency for purposes of such statistics is defined as a debt due but
unpaid for over 30 days.
25. Caplovitz estimates that only 1 percent of the entire sample never intended to
pay from the outset. Others were either negligent or missed payments for such reasons as
being out of town, forgetting to make payments or loss or destruction of the merchandise
purchased. See pp. 85-90. Certainly such reasons do not excuse the consumer from his
obligation, but neither do they support the traditional "dead beat" image.
26. Caplovitz found that both debtors who were and debtors who were not subject to
garnishment began to make repayments on their obligations. Certainly, if the voluntarily
overextended group of debtors in the study had complied with the stereotype of the
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as some highly innovative solutions to the problems he has uncovered. Thus he takes up the cudgels against such traditional foes
as the doctrine of holder in due course, and the deficiency judgment. He also poses such novel ideas as a ban on door-to-door
sales of items with a market value in excess of $50, and a flexible
credit marketing system where interest rates would vary according to a debtor's past performance and the speed of repayment.
He suggests a specialized consumer court modeled to some extent
on New York City's highly effective Small Claims Court. But the
author falters in his effort to reform by not clearly spelling out the
principles which must be applied in order to reshape the law and
its administration in this area. While he is thoughtful in his attacks on present problems, he does not provide the rules for dealing with the problems that will replace them should the present
evils be solved. With a group that is undereducated, underemployed and traditionally powerless, as were most of the debtors
in the sample, it is folly to believe that providing them with rights
which must be asserted in order to be gained will effectively protect them.
For example, it would be much more equitable to shift the
burden of proof in many consumer transactions to the merchant.
The direct seller should be required to plead and prove, as part
of his case, compliance with the FTC's cooling-off period requirements." Furthermore, ready access must be granted to resources
which will provide the consumer with adequate means to assert
his claims and to defend his rights.
The use of prepaid legal services programs also must be
expanded.28 The new National Legal Services Corporation"
irresponsible "dead beat," the latter group would have been substantially smaller than
the former or would not have existed at all. See p. 254, Table 12.13.
27. See 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1974); 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1973).
28. At the present time the thrust for prepaid programs comes primarily from trade
unions. The Laborers International Union has an extensive program in the Washington,
D.C. area and District Council 37, AFSCME, the major New York City municipal employees union, has just embarked on a pilot project financed in part by the Ford Foundation
and conducted in conjunction with Columbia Law School and Columbia School of Social
Work. After an initial setback, a municipal employees union (Teamster Local 237) and a
local bar association (New York County Lawyers Association) won approval from the
Court of Appeals to establish prepaid programs in New York City to be operated by notfor-profit corporations. See In re Barry Feinstein, 173 N.Y.L.J. 56, March 24, 1975 at 5,
col. 1, reversing a decision of the Appellate Division, reported at 45 App. Div. 440, 357
N.Y.S. 2d 516 (1st Dep't 1974). Advocates of prepaid programs are greatly encouraged by
this decision and see it as advancing the development of such programs within New York.
However, other groups such as church groups, students, and credit unions, are taking an
interest in the formation of prepaid programs. With a natural constituency in easy com-

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol3/iss3/16

28

Donnelly: Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement. By William Twining; Rosc

Book Reviews
should be urged not only to provide for legal services to the poor,
but also to take steps to encourage the development of prepaid
programs, particularly where the group to be served falls just
short of qualifying for free legal assistance. In a well stated case,
Caplovitz advocates the use of neighborhood consumer courts to
conduct arbitration proceedings in consumer disputes, but he
overlooks one of arbitrations great advantages-arbitrators are
not bound by rules of law. Having pointed out that much of the
law in the area derives from the same body of law that governs
commercial transactions, and that this body of law is inappropriate to consumer transactions, what better way to break these
fetters than to utilize a system where these rules need not be
followed? The commercial bar has already expressed the fear that
it may be drawn into the vortex created by legislative and judicial
efforts to reform the law for the consumers' benefit. They would
welcome an opportunity to head off further damaging judicial
precedents."
Efforts should also be made to provide a skilled paraprofessional force, trained in the basic areas of consumer law,
which would be available to provide assistance to consumers in
their defense in legal proceedings, in making their claims, and in
counseling them in advance. Such a cadre of consumer aides
would stretch the existing supply of lawyers, and would also help
to make the best use of the professional resources available. This
group might be developed out of persons already involved in the
social services field who have developed techniques for locating
and assisting those most in need of help.
The concerned members of bench and bar should make a
concerted effort to purge the ranks of the bar of those attorneys
who seek to collect by threat, intimidation, or other improper
munication with each other, these people could be effective vehicles to dramatically
increase the delivery of legal services. See also note 17 supra.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2996 f(g) (1974) directs that the corporation shall provide a study of
prepaid legal service systems, among other systems, for the delivery of legal assistance,
and report back to the President and the Congress within two years of the first meeting
of the board of directors of the corporation. The corporation presently has grant-making
authority which could be used in certain circumstances to assist prepaid programs. See
42 U.S.C.A. § 2996 f(c) (1974).
30. A similar view was recently expressed by the head of the Commercial Law League
of America in an address before the annual Credit Congress of the National Association
of Credit Management. See Hertzberg, Consumerism and Commercial Credit: You Can't
LAw JouNAL 338 (1974). See also Leff, Injury,
Add Apples and Oranges, 79 CobsimcLn.
Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L. J. 1 (1970).
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means. If, for instance, the courts regularly referred to grievance
committees and the district attorney's office cases where default
judgments were vacated because of a "sewer service," this prac31
tice might come to an end.
The "Brandeis brief' is a properly revered part of our legal
tradition. In the original Brandeis brief, Brandeis pleaded the
pressing social realities which faced women laundry workers while
his colleagues in that case made the more traditional legal arguments. David Caplovitz has written an eloquent Brandeis brief
for the consumer movement in Consumers in Trouble. It now
rests with the bench, the bar and the legislatures to fashion the
appropriate remedies-and that task is none too soon begun.
31. The Association of the Bar published a report in 1968 which focused on ethical
problems raised by the conduct of certain collection lawyers. See Improper Collection
Practices,23 RacoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 441 (1968) (Report of the Committees on Grievances
and Legal Assistance). In 1974, the Appellate Division did bring disciplinary action with
regard to a collection attorney who had utilized fraudulent affidavits of military service.
See In re Shenghit, 44 App. Div. 2d 440 (1st Dep't 1974). Still the condition continues.
The most recent effort to curb sewer service is evidenced by a rule of the Appellate
Divisions for the First and Second Departments, which requires that before a default can
be entered in Civil Court the attorney seeking it must supply the clerk of the court with a
notice of what the default entails and an envelope addressed to the debtor at the address
at which service was made. The return address on such envelope is that of the clerk. If
the letter is returned because of an improper address or because the debtor does not reside
at the given address, judgment cannot be entered. For an extensive and perceptive discussion of the new rule and of the problems which still remain in the area of sewer service,
see Schrag, Consumer Law-New Court Rule Will Curb "Sewer Service", 173 N.Y.L.J.
30, Feb. 13, 1975 at 1, col. 1.
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JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. By PeterGraham Fish.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
1973. Pp. xiv, 528. $20.00.
Reviewed by Alice L. O'Donnell**
In some 500 pages, Professor Peter Graham Fish's The Politics of FederalJudicialAdministrationhas chronicled the history
of the federal courts, placing particular emphasis on the last half
century. The book presents its topic of concern well, and to this
extent, the author has performed a great service."
Those of us in the legal profession, particularly we who work
in the federal courts area, may put the book down with some
disappointment, however. Passed up by the author was a splendid opportunity to voice criticism and analysis based on years of
study devoted exclusively to federal judicial administration. Perhaps what Professor Fish had in mind was to stimulate some
thinking and forced self-analysis from the federal judiciary itself.
Woven into each chapter are bits of history which make the
reader question why certain procedures and decisions were or
were not adopted or made, and whether these policy alternatives
resulted more from the presence of personalities on the scene than
from logic or the demands of the time. For example, many pages
are devoted to the Judicial Councils-how they are constituted,
how and when they meet, and the manner in which they exercise
their powers.' But the author leaves many related issues
unanswered: just how extensive are the Councils' powers; are
there inherent judicial powers in them which could be exercised
to a greater degree than have been up to now; why are district
judges excluded? An even greater omission is the lack of reference
to the Circuit Judicial Conferences-how and why were they created; how do they function; what is the history of their statutorily
mandated meetings?
On the positive side, Professor Fish does well to remind us
that we have inherited a solid, viable and durable document from
our founding fathers-the Constitution of the United States. Our
federal court system, which evolved both from this document and

THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL

* The author received his B.A. degree from Princeton University and his M.A. and
Ph.D. degrees from Johns Hopkins University. He is currently Professor and Director of
Graduate Studies of the Political Science Department of Duke University.
** Director, Division of Inter-Judicial Affairs, The Federal Judicial Center. LL.B.
George Washington University, 1954.
1. Pp. 379-426.
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from our Congress, is perhaps the strongest and most workable
of recent world history. To put it another way, it has survived in
spite of history.
When Supreme Court Justices rode circuit, vacancies on the
high court often went unfilled for long periods of time because the
positions were considered undesirable for men who wanted both
an orderly life and a job that brought good pay. At that time the
federal judiciary was small, for the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided
for only one District Court Judge in each state. Today the system
functions with approximately 600 federal judges 2 and federal
boundaries that encompass 94 districts and eleven circuits. The
workload of the courts in these jurisdictions has grown at such an
accelerated rate in recent years that Congress found it necessary
to constitute the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System to study the problem.'
A further response to this expansion is the recently established Advisory Council on Appellate Justice, an independent
group of concerned and knowledgeable lawyers, law professors
and judges (state and federal) which has been studying all aspects of the problems on the federal circuit level for over three
years. It was formed originally by Columbia Law Professor Maurice Rosenberg, who has remained Chairman throughout its history. To further the good work of this council and to encourage
further exploration for answers, co-sponsorship was furnished by
the Federal Judicial Center and the the National Center for State
Courts. The more than thirty Council members contribute their
time at no cost to either organization. This is a great testimonial
to the unselfish and dedicated service that lawyers and judges
throughout the country provide because of their concern for our
appellate courts.4 Still another study which included an examination of the appellate courts was that done at the request of the
2. This number includes a count of the senior federal judges. Senior judges are those
who by length of service and age are retired but elect to continue their service either on a
full or part-time basis.
3. The Commission was created in 1972 and released its first report in November,
1973. Entitled THE GEORGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CmCUITS ALTERNATVE PRoposALs, this document considered changes in the structural realignment of the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits. The second phase of study, dealing with the internal operating
procedures of the circuits, will be concluded by June, 1975. The final report of this group
will be made available at that time.
4. The Council's work was concluded in January, 1975 when it invited over 250
conferees to gather at Coronado, California to discuss various recommendations emanating from all sources. Reporters were present to summarize these discussions and it is
anticipated that the official materials will be available soon.
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Federal Judicial Center under the direction of Professor Paul
Freund of Harvard Law School over two years ago. The report,
entitled, Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, contains over 70 pages of facts, charts, conclusions
and recommendations for study and consideration.5
By speaking about the federal judiciary's constant expansion
throughout his book, Professor Fish may be pointing out that this
continuous growth necessitates adherence to a basic principleany large body must be governed by some uniform means.' No
amount of literature on the "independence of the judiciary"7
can negate the need to accept this concept. What can be mistakenly subscribed to, however, is the notion that the two concepts can not be practically accommodated together in the same
system.
The centralization of control in policy making for the federal
court system rests in the Judicial Conference of the United
States, with the Chief Justice of the United States, the permanent Chairman. To achieve a geographical balance, each circuit
is represented by its Chief Judge and a district judge elected from
each circuit, as well as the chief judges from the special courts.
Thus, there is liberal opportunity for free input through conference participation and reports. Proof that the judiciary takes full
advantage of this opportunity is demonstrated twice a year when
voluminous reports of the standing and special committees of the
conference are distributed. Subjects of these reports range from
personnel problems to more substantive issues related to the federal jury system, sentencing, probation reports and rules of evidence. What is adopted after careful consideration of these reports represents the best thinking of the majority. Though the
discussions take place in closed sessions, it is no secret that some
5. Among this group's recommendations were the creation of a National Court of
Appeals to decide on the merits conflicts among the circuits, changes in appeals and
certiorari procedures and the statutory establishment of a non-judicial body whose members would investigate and report on prison conditions.
6. See Reports on the Conferencefor District CourtJudges, 59 F.R.D. 415-82 (1973).
7. See e.g., P. WESTON & K. WELLS, THE ADMImSTRATION OF JUSTICE (1973); see also
the remarks of Chief Judge Edward J. Devitt, United States District Court for the District
of Minnesota, on this subject in, ADMiNisTRATlVE OFFICE OF THE UmITED STATES COURTS,
SEMINAR FOR NEWLY APPOINTED UNITED STATES DISTcYP JUDGES 7 (1971) and the Address
by Rufus L. Edmisten, Chief Counsel, Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers,
before the 1970 Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, July 13, 1970, entitled, Will Judicial
Independence Become an EvanescentDream?, referred to in HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Separationof Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., 932 (1970).
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conference decisions are often accompanied by very vigorous dissents. The point is that the process works. The decisions made
through this body are imposed upon all who work within the
system, and the federal judiciary operates more effectively as a
result. Further, the "independence of the judiciary" is not jeopardized or weakened by this process.
Up to now, no serious criticism has been leveled against this
type of centralization and control. Attacks have come, however,
from attempts to create uniformity. Although this criticism stems
from the judiciary, it is the members of the bar who lose when
uniformity is lacking. An excellent example of this is the effort
of the bar to get more uniformity in the local rules which are
presently devised by each of the district courts. In the vast majority of these courts, rules are promulgated without the involvement of the bar. To the great credit of several forward thinking
judges, however, some local rules are the product of committees
created by the court and constituted with full representation from
both bench and bar. While it is true that unique local situations
may call for special local rules, districts can still operate with a
degree of uniformity. For example, counsel in one district could
be permitted to litigate in another without unnecessary and unreasonable restrictions.
Other questions are prompted by Professor Fish's review of
the history of the federal courts as well: why not a federal bar
which would permit reputable counsel with good standing to litigate in all districts; why the necessity, in these days of quick and
ready communication and travel, for the utilization of local counsel, when out-of-state counsel are retained?8 An example of how
the restrictive admissions requirement works to the detriment of
indigents was recently related to me by a professor at one of our
large law schools. To make a contribution to his chosen profession
he offered his services at a federal prison in an eastern state. Later
he elected to teach in a western law school and took his case files
with him so that he might continue his assistance to indigents.
At least one of his clients was then transferred to a prison in
another state. As the professor was not admitted to the bar of that
state, and since he was not in fact a resident of the state where
papers had to be filed, he was precluded from further assisting his
client. Even more frustrating, however, was his inability to find
8. See generally, Agata, Admissions and Discipline of Attorneys in FederalDistrict
Courts: A Study and Proposed Rules, 3 HOFsmA L. Ray. 249 (1975).
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counsel in the jurisdiction of the prison who was willing to con-

tribute time to indigent cases.9 With a little more uniformity and
somewhat more flexibility, an indigent prisoner in need of legal
services could have been fully assisted. This is but one of many
examples where the lack of uniformity works to the detriment of
the system and the people it serves.
The Politics of Federal Judicial Administration-complete
as it is-causes the reader to wonder what really makes our federal judicial system work and what makes it survive. Whatever
the answer, the logical question follows as to whether changes
should be made. No thinking individual can put the book down
without reflecting on this problem.
One worries whether the history Professor Fish has recorded
has really brought forth the best possible federal court system. It
is hard to come up with viable alternatives based on this history.
In the final analysis, we have a small number of judges working
in a very specialized area of the law and the system has merely
adjusted over the years. The strongest criticism that could be
inveighed against the evolution of the system centers on the great
length of time it took to establish the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts. It is hard to understand the thinking of the
leaders of all three branches of Government in vesting the business of the federal courts in the Department of Justice. As Professor Fish records in Chapter 3, the Justice Department prepared
the budget for the courts, printed and distributed the forms necessary to carry out its business, allotted and distributed the salaries of the judges and supporting personnel and provided for a
Division of Examiners periodically to visit and examine the
courts."0 This created a potential conflict of interest, for the Attorney General and his corps of United States Attorneys were constantly litigating before the judges they served in this housekeeping capacity." In 1939 Congress finally saw fit to correct a bad
9. Students at Washington and Lee Law School have made a fine contribution to the
effective administration of criminal justice at the Federal Reformatory for Women at
Alderson, West Virginia, by advising inmates on legal problems under the direction of
their law professors. Washington and Lee, however, is in Virginia and the institution is in
West Virginia. Thus, unless the professors are licensed to practice in West Virginia they
are foreclosed from filing papers for their indigent clients in this state. An additional
impediment to full legal assistance for these indigents is in the geographical location of
the Reformatory which is situated in a rural area where few if any local counsel are
available.
10. Pp. 91-124.
11. Perhaps this is one reason why one chief judge, since deceased, was reported to
have said to an associate when he learned that an agent of the Division of Examiners had
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situation and created the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts. This office now handles all housekeeping matters
for the federal judges. The examiners are now a part of that
agency, and the Attorney General functions strictly within the
executive branch; only the marshals, who also serve the courts,
remain in the Department of Justice. Perhaps this too will be
changed in time.
More than history alone brings about change. We can be
grateful for vigilant, concerned people who serve both the bench
and bar. To the great credit of the profession, improvements come
about through cooperative efforts. This is in a large measure due
to strong leadership in organizations such as the Federal Bar
Association and the American Bar Association. At no time in our
history have federal judges been so involved in both. The 17 volumes of the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal
Justice were the product of a seven year endeavor with great
contributions from federal judges eager to improve judicial administration in both state and federal courts. Following completion of this work, a number of federal judges responded to the call
of the ABA President and joined with state judges, lawyers and
law professors to serve on a commission to update standards originally set out by the late Chief Justice Arthur Vanderbilt in his
publication, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration.
The contribution made by the federal judiciary to the drafting of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, another ABA endeavor that ultimately received approval of the Judicial Conference of the United
States is also significant. With a few modifications imposing canons upon themselves which were even more rigid than those of the
ABA, the Conference adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct for
United States Judges which now applies to all federal judges,
magistrates and bankruptcy judges. The Federal Bar Association
has had equally commendable participation from the federal judiciary in the programs it has sponsored to bring about better
judicial administration in the federal courts. A very recent example of this participation and support is the plan to put on regional
programs relating to the new rules of evidence.
arrived to examine his court: "Fine, take him to lunch, to the golf course and then to the
railroad station and bid him have a safe journey home." This incident was related to me
by Judge Alfred P. Murrah, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and former
Director of the Federal Judicial Center. Judge Murrah ascribes the experience of some of
the first days he served on the circuit court after having been elevated from the United
States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.
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The greatest, or at least the most publicized influence of both
associations stems from their recommendations and evaluations
on appointments to the federal bench. It is a powerful influence
and an effective procedure that is designed to bring to the federal
bench able and dedicated jurists. Both the executive and the
legislative branches heed the words of these groups, for they are
keenly aware that they can be formidable opponents. These associations also examine our system of selection and tenure on the
federal bench, and Congress and the federal judges themselves
have never discouraged this. Even if no changes are made in this
area for years to come, it would be well to continue the dialogue.
These national associations, as well as local bar associations are,
as they should be, an important part of the "politics of federal
judicial administration." It is something our foreign visitors often
question when they visit this country, but as one European judge
recently commented to me, "I don't understand just why you
select your judges the way you do, but the system works well so

it is hard to argue against

it.

' 12
'

Professor Fish has pointed out, consciously or not, that we
can be grateful for the history the federal judiciary has on record.
He has made his reader ponder on the wisdom of the system and
thus has made us more aware than perhaps we were that, though
we have an obligation to constantly monitor our system, we
should not be too hasty with change. The "third branch" has
always been slow to change. There is good reason for this, for
judges are inherently an apprehensive lot and the nature of their
work sharpens this feeling. They are unwilling to experiment with
lives, and often this is what change means. They want to know
precisely what results will come from changes before they are
willing to accept them.
All of which is to say that Professor Fish has not only given
cause for thought, he has given himself a reason for a sequel to
his book which could more fully explore the questions he raises.
12. One of the functions of the Federal Judicial Center's Division on Inter-Judicial
Affairs is to meet with and brief visiting judges from all parts of the world. Our provisions
for selection and tenure of federal judges are without a doubt the subject we are most
frequently questioned about by these foreign judges. Vastly different from many European
countries where judges are specifically schooled for the judiciary before they enter the
profession, this phase of our judicial system receives the most scrutiny.
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